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Abstract
Machery et al. (Cognition 92: B1–B12, 2004 ; Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 79: 332–356, 2009a , Analysis 69: 689–694, b ;
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86: 618–635, 2012 ) claim that
analytic philosophers of language are committed to a method of cases (MC)
according to which theories of reference are assessed by consulting semantic
intuitions about actual and possible cases. Since empirical evidence suggests
that such intuitions vary both within and across cultures, these experimental
semanticists conclude that the traditional attempt at pursuing such theories is
misguided. Against the backdrop of Kripke’s anti-descriptivist arguments,
this paper offers a novel response to the challenge posed by Machery et al.,
arguing that they either misplace or exaggerate the role played by (MC). The
lesson is that while semantic intuitions carry evidential weight in evaluating
certain subjunctive conditionals reflecting counterfactual possibilities, they
neither play an epistemic role in determining the actual reference of proper
names, nor in evaluating certain indicative conditionals reflecting so-called
counteractual possibilities. Moreover, once an asymmetry is acknowledged in
Machery et al’s vignette between the narrator and the subject’s suppositions
about the actual world, a corresponding ambiguity can account for the alleged
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1.  Experimental Semantics
Machery et al. ( 2004 ; Machery et al. 2009a , b ; 2012 ), henceforth MMNS,
claim that the way analytic philosophers of language determine which theory of
reference is correct is by appeal to intuitions about the reference of terms in
actual and possible cases. For instance, Kripke ( 1980 ) proposed cases designed
to elicit widespread semantic intuitions that were inconsistent with
descriptivism. In so doing MMNS (op. cit.) maintain that Kripke embraced what
they call ‘the method of cases’ (MC):
AQ2
The correct theory of reference for a class of terms T is the theory which is best
supported by the intuitions competent users of T have about the reference of
members of T across actual and possible cases.
Obviously, (MC) presupposes a sufficient degree of uniformity of pertinent
intuitions among users of T. Otherwise their intuitions would have little or no
evidential bearing on the theory of reference in question. After all, MMNS are
interested in theories of semantic reference which purport to account for the
reference of members of T irrespective of which particular contexts its users are
in. Adopting a variant of Kripke’s Gödel case, MMNS present empirical
evidence for inter- and intra-cultural variation in semantic intuitions. Against
the backdrop of (MC), they take such evidence to raise skeptical questions
about the philosophical attempt to pursue a theory of reference. As we shall see,
Devitt ( 2010 : 419) and Ichikawa et al. ( 2012 : 5–10) correctly point out that the
Gödel case plays a much smaller role in Kripke’s overall argument against
descriptivism than MMNS (2004) assume. MMNS (2012) emphasize more
cagily that their goal was never to question the attack that Kripke launched on
descriptivism as such, but much broader: to challenge the way philosophers of
language go about determining what the right theory of reference is. Perhaps
MMNS are thus only interested in evidence that bears directly on developing a
full-fledged theory of reference. But as the semantic intuition elicited by the
Gödel case only aims to present trouble for descriptivism, and thus at best only
indirectly supports Kripke’s preferred causal-historical alternative, that case
would consequently be rendered idle by their lights. These considerations
suggest that MMNS’ goal is best understood as including critiques of rival
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theories. In keeping with the response literature, we shall be concerned with the
way Kripke goes about determining whether descriptivism is true, and in
particular whether MMNS are right that Kripke’s intuition-based arguments are
flawed due to intuitional variation within and across cultures.  This paper offers
a novel response to the challenge posed by experimental semantics, arguing that
MMNS either misplace or exaggerate the role played by (MC) in the anti-
descriptivist arguments that Kripke advanced. Section II shows that Kripke
appealed to something like (MC) in his modal argument against the view that
proper names are synonymous with commonly associated descriptions, yet
MMNS (2012) are explicitly not concerned with this view. While semantic
intuitions can be taken to play an epistemic role in evaluating subjunctive
conditionals reflecting counterfactual possibilities, Kripke also paved the way
for an underlying explanation of rigidity. Section III demonstrates that no
appeal was made to (MC) in Kripke’s semantic arguments against the weaker
view that MMNS have in mind, namely that proper names have their reference
fixed descriptively. Intuitions neither play an epistemic role in determining the
actual reference of proper names, nor in evaluating indicative conditionals
reflecting so-called counteractual possibilities. Section IV argues that once an
asymmetry is acknowledged in MMNS’ vignette between the narrator and the
subject’s suppositions about the actual world, a corresponding ambiguity can
account for the alleged culturally determined variation in semantic intuitions.
That is to say, depending on which suppositional perspective the participants
adopt, it turns out their answers do not reliably indicate which theory of
reference they implicitly adhere to. Finally, Section V contains some concluding
remarks.
2.  The Modal Argument: Intuitions About
Counterfactuals
Let’s adopt Soames’ ( 2005 : 19, 69) distinction between strong descriptivism—
the view that definite description D  commonly associated with proper name n
by competent speaker S yields the semantic content of n such that n refers to
whatever object at possible world w satisfies D —and weak descriptivism—the
view that D  fixes the reference of n such that n refers to whatever object in the
actual world (@) satisfies D , no matter how @ turns out. Adopting this
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arguments, which we shall discuss in Sections II and III, respectively. Four
comments are worth bearing in mind. First, both weak and strong descriptivism
are views about how our language actually works, as opposed to the way any
possible language works. Second, for ease of exposition, we restrict attention to
single-description versions of strong and weak descriptivism. We briefly
consider cluster versions in Section III. Third, only strong descriptivism is a
view in descriptive semantics about the semantic content of n. Weak
descriptivism takes no stance on what content is semantically expressed by n.
Fourth, only strong descriptivism says that the reference of n at w is
semantically determined by satisfaction of D . According to weak
descriptivism, once the reference of n is fixed descriptively, n is stipulated to
retain that reference at all w.
In contrast, the causal-historical view says that once n is introduced into
language by some act of baptism, n retains the same reference as long as its
users are linked to that original act via a causal-historical chain of successive
users. Again, three observations are in order. First, just as in the case of
descriptivism, this view only pertains to the actual workings of our language.
Second, this is a view in foundational semantics about what makes n have the
reference that n has. Third, advocates of the causal-historical view typically
allow for the rarity of descriptive names having their reference in @ fixed
descriptively, but once they are up and running, D  plays no further reference-
determining role. If object x has the property expressed by the reference-fixing
D , the descriptive name refers rigidly to x, even at a w where x fails to have
that property.
Let’s now probe into the role intuitions play in Kripke’s modal argument as
leveled against strong descriptivism. The argument runs as follows:
(1) If strong descriptivism is true, then a proper name n and a definite
description D , both actually used in our language, have the same
semantic content.
(2) If n and D  coincide in semantic content, then they are intersubstitutable
in sentences where they are embedded under standard modal operators
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(3) But as n is a rigid designator and D  is non-rigid, substituting n with D
in such modal contexts results in truth-value changes.
(4) So, strong descriptivism is false.
As (1) is true by definition and (2) follows on the assumption that modal
properties individuate semantic content, intuitions play no role in justifying
either premise. In support of (3) Kripke ( 1980 : 48–49, 83–92) proposed an
“intuitive test” for rigidity :
(ITR) A referring term t is a rigid designator of object x if and only if no one
other than x might have been t.
For instance, ‘the inventor of LEGO’ is non-rigid, because somebody other than
the inventor of LEGO, i.e., Kirk Christiansen, might have invented LEGO, but
‘Kirk Christiansen’ is rigid, because nobody other than Kirk Christiansen might
have been Kirk Christiansen.  Kripke ( 1980 : 6, cf. 14–15) suggested that the
intuition that n is rigid stems from the direct referentiality of n when describing
counterfactual situations, i.e., ways things might have been but are not: we have
a “natural” and “direct intuition of the rigidity of proper names, exhibited in our
understanding of the truth-conditions of particular sentences.” He asked us to
consider the simple sentence:
(5) Aristotle was fond of dogs
Assuming ‘Aristotle’ is directly referential, (5) has the singular truth-condition:
there is a man, namely Aristotle, such that (5) true if and only if he was fond of
dogs. Our intuition that ‘Aristotle’ is rigid is grounded in the fact that the same
truth-condition applies as (5) describes a counterfactual situation: (5) truly
describes such a situation just in case the same man would have been fond of
dogs had that situation obtained.
It is thus clear that Kripke appealed to intuitions when arguing that proper
names are rigid. The question is whether that appeal is epistemic in the sense
that semantic intuitions are taken to provide evidential support for the claim that
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philosophers, Cappelen ( 2012 ) contends that contemporary analytic
philosophers neither rely on intuitions as evidence for their theories, nor rely
evidentially on intuitions when making judgments about cases. In particular,
Cappelen claims that Kripke took ‘intuitively, p’ to mean something close to:
pre-theoretically, p, where being pre-theoretic is not being prior to all
theorizing, but rather being independent of the answer to the question under
discussion in the context. Importantly, “there is no evidence that [Kripke] treats
being intuitive as carrying evidential weight” ( 2012 : 73, fn. 15). Note that
Cappelen is here making a purely descriptive claim about what Kripke treats as
evidence, not a claim about what his evidence actually is. But Cappelen is
wrong about key occurrences of ‘intuitive’. Take this passage (1980 : 42),
immediately before (ITR) is introduced:
“…some philosophers think that something’s having intuitive
content is very inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I think it is
very heavy evidence in favor of anything, myself. I really don’t
know, in a way, what more conclusive evidence one can have
about anything, ultimately speaking.”
Here Kripke says he is treating the intuitive content of proposition p to
constitute evidence for p. Since Kripke ( 1980 : 48) also explicitly takes the
content of the thesis that proper names are rigid to be intuitive, it follows that
he takes himself to be regarding the intuitive content of that thesis to constitute
evidence for it. But perhaps, following Cappelen ( 2012 : 206), Kripke is
amongst those who are methodologically self-deceived on this score:
“…some philosophers in moments of confused meta-reflection
will often describe what they do as relying on intuitions…”.
That Kripke should be mistaken not just about what his evidence for the rigidity
thesis is, but also about what he regards as his evidence, seems exceedingly
unlikely. True, he offers no theory of how to cash out talk about intuitions, e.g.,
as Bealer’s ( 2002 : 73) intellectual seemings, or as Williamson’s ( 2004 : 125)
conscious inclinations to believe or judge. I shall not here delve into any
exegetical details, but it would indeed be puzzling why Kripke proposed (ITR)
30/01/2015 10:59e.Proofing
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in the first place if he did not consider it a reliable way of settling questions
about rigidity, hence regarded passing the test as furnishing evidence for
rigidity. As witnessed by the passage just quoted, Kripke took being intuitive as
providing “very heavy” and “conclusive” evidence for a thesis. Admittedly, one
might want to eschew exuberant contentions such as that intuitions confer
foundational or indefeasible evidential support, and instead rest content with the
more modest claim that intuitions provide prime facie evidence. In any case,
Kripke is plausibly understood to be utilizing intuitions about rigidity as serving
an epistemic purpose in his modal argument against strong descriptivism.
The foregoing suggests that Kripke would endorse (MC) vis-à-vis his modal
argument against strong descriptivism, given that Kripke takes this view to
make predictions about the reference of proper names at counterfactual worlds
which contradict the intuitions that competent users of those names have about
their reference at such worlds. As a theory of reference for proper names, strong
descriptivism is therefore incorrect. In the remaining part of this section, we
shall argue that Kripke’s adherence to (MC) does not commit him to a
psychologically spurious faculty of intuition. First off, distinguish between what
serves as evidence and what the source of that evidence is. To say that
consulting intuitions about cases evidentially supports a proposition p is not the
same as saying that the act of having the intuition that q serves as evidence for
p. Rather, q is the evidence for p, but the source of that evidence stems from the
act of having an intuition with q as its content. This means that as long as q
concerns non-psychological matters, intuitions can carry evidential weight
without thereby psychologizing evidence in the skepticism-inducing way that
Williamson ( 2007 : 214, 235) warns against. Moreover, having an intuition that
q need not be a psychological act that results from exercising some dubious
faculty of intuition, such as forms of intellectual perception which may strike
one as mysterious. Importantly, none of the premises in Kripke’s modal
argument relies on any such faculty. Here’s why. The kind of rigidity Kripke has
in mind at this juncture is that of subjunctive rigidity. The question is: given
that a proper name n refers to object x in @, does n refer to x at all
counterfactual w? As counterfactual possibility is best captured by subjunctive
conditionals, we can address this question by evaluating such conditionals
containing n.  Thus, if strong descriptivism is true, then the description ‘the
inventor of LEGO’ and the name ‘Kirk Christiansen’ coincide in semantic
5
30/01/2015 10:59e.Proofing
Page 8 of 32http://eproofing.springer.com/journals/printpage.php?token=bFdDQJ-Uv5T9EJCZl0UCy2ZK0NleFyXFTNhkL3IGiFeKYxd35nPTiA
content. Consequently, the following conditional should be true:
(6) If Hans Beck had invented LEGO, then Kirk Christiansen would have
been Hans Beck.
According to a standard Lewisian semantics, (6) is true at @ if some w in which
Hans Beck invented LEGO and Kirk Christensen = Hans Beck are closer to @
than are any w where Hans Beck invented LEGO but Kirk Christensen ≠ Hans
Beck, where closeness is a similarity metric on w. As Hans Beck and Kirk
Christiansen are actually distinct, even if Hans Beck had invented LEGO, which
(6) signals that he did not, he would not have been Kirk Christiansen. The
closest w in question are ones in which Hans Beck invented LEGO instead of
Kirk Christiansen. It’s unclear how empirical considerations could be brought to
bear in determining the similarity between these w. The reason we judge (6) to
be false is simply that we cannot make room for the thought that two
individuals who are distinct in @ should be identical in some counterfactual w.
Speakers who are competent with the notion of strict identity will judge that
two individuals are necessarily identical if actually identical.
Kripke’s explanation is rather that in so far as the judgment that (6) is false is
based on intuitions about rigidity, these intuitions are rooted in ordinary
abilities to use proper names as directly referential terms rather than in a sui
generis faculty of intuition.  Any speaker S who competently uses n has a
reliable ability to directly latch onto its referent x in counterfactual thinking. S
need not antecedently identify x via satisfaction of some description D  in the
counterfactual w in question. If S lacked that ability, S would not be able to
engage successfully in such thinking. In particular, if the reference of n
suddenly shifted in a counterfactual w in which some distinct object x* satisfied
D , S could no longer use n to reflect on what would be the case with respect to
x had w obtained. But given that S is in fact able to correctly determine the
truth-value of such subjunctive conditionals containing n, knowledge of them
must be based on an ability to directly pick out its referent in counterfactual
circumstances. That is illustrated by (5) when describing such a circumstance.
Importantly, as S can exercise that ability without drawing on empirical
knowledge of @, the source of that knowledge is not empirical in any robust
sense. For example, knowing that (6) is false is independent of knowledge that
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retained under the counterfactual supposition that Hans Beck invented LEGO.
In other words, even though speakers initially find (6) false on the basis of
consulting their intuition about how to describe counterfactual scenarios given
what they know about @, the truth condition of (6) is not relative to any
particular knowledge of @. The reason is that such counterfactual possibilities
are metaphysical rather than epistemic: when w is considered as counterfactual,
we ask what might have been the case given the way @ is.
In sum, one can grant with Kripke that speakers rely epistemically on intuitions
about how to describe certain counterfactual scenarios when judging that
subjunctive conditionals such as (6) are false, without positing a special faculty
of intuition. For that judgment is explainable without irreducible appeal to
intuitions, once speakers’ reliable ability to directly hook onto objects in
counterfactual thinking is taken into account. Similarly, the claim in (3) that
proper names are rigid and definite descriptions are non-rigid may rely
epistemically on semantic intuitions without invoking any such mysterious
faculty. The upshot is that since MMNS (2012) disregard strong descriptivism,
they ignore the limited role that intuitions play in the modal argument, which is
fully explicable in terms of competent speakers’ ability to directly pick out
objects when entertaining counterfactual scenarios.
3.  The Semantic Arguments: Intuitions About
Actuals and Counteractuals
Assuming with Kripke that the modal argument refutes strong descriptivism, we
now turn to weak descriptivism. The latter view is only afflicted by his semantic
arguments, which aim to show that the reference of proper name n is not
determined via satisfaction of definite description D  as associated with n by
S.  The semantic arguments comprise two types of actual cases and one type of
hypothetical case, which we will deal with in turn. The arguments that pertain
to actual cases claim that it is possible that S uses n to refer uniquely to object x
even though S associates no D  with n which is uniquely satisfied by x, either
because S has incorrect descriptive information of x, or because S has correct
but not uniquely identifying information of x. In ( 1980 : 81–85) Kripke offers
common-or-garden examples of successful usage of proper names, despite
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(7) If weak descriptivism is true, then S uses proper name n competently to
refer to x in virtue of associating definite description D  with n which is
uniquely satisfied by x, where both n and D  are actually used in our
language.
(8) S uses n (‘Columbus’) competently to refer to x (Columbus), but D  (’the
first European explorer to reach the Americas’) as associated with n by S
is uniquely satisfied by distinct object x* (Leif Ericson).
(9) So, weak descriptivism is false.
And here is the argument from ignorance:
(10) If weak descriptivism is true, then S uses proper name n competently to
refer to x in virtue of associating definite description D  with n which is
uniquely satisfied by x, where both n and D  are actually used in our
language.
(11) S uses n (‘Richard Feynman’) competently to refer to x (Richard
Feynman), but S associates with n an indefinite description D  (‘a
famous physicist’) which is also satisfied by distinct object x* (Marie
Curie).
(12) So, weak descriptivism is false.
In conjunction, these two arguments show that there need not be a D
associated by S with n such that S uses n competently to refer to x and D  is
uniquely satisfied by x. S might well use n competently to refer to x even
though no D  is both uniquely satisfied by x and associated with n by S, either
because x does not satisfy associated D , or else because x satisfies associated
D  but not uniquely so. Hence, no associated D  determines the reference of n
as used by S.
The question is now whether intuitions play any epistemic role in justifying the
premises of either argument. Friends and foes of experimental semantics think
so. For instance, Devitt ( 2010 : 221) says that “intuitions are certainly the basis
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about actual humdrum cases are epistemically more important than intuitions
about hypothetical ones.” Machery et al. ( 2012 ) insist that “philosophers of
language typically appeal to the intuitions of competent speakers about the
reference of proper names […] in actual […] cases”, and they acknowledge “the
intuitions about actual cases that form the basis of the argument from error and
ignorance”. Ichikawa et al (2011: 9) hold that intuitions about real examples are
more accurate than intuitions about tricky cases.
AQ3
AQ4
Now, nothing prevents one from having an intuition that, say, ‘Ban Ki-moon’
refers to Ban Ki-moon, but the claim on the table is that intuitions form the
basis of knowledge of the actual reference of proper names. That seems wrong.
First off, competent speakers are arguably a priori entitled to a homophonic
disquotation device in their own language, assuming no meaning-affecting
hypothesis is actually true.  This means S can know that in her language ‘Ban
Ki-moon’ refers to Ban Ki-moon without recourse to empirical investigation.
Such default entitlements are not underpinned by intuition, but rather accrue
with linguistic competence in a given language. However, the fact that S is
entitled to disquote her own language implies no identifying knowledge of
reference. S certainly cannot know a priori that in her language ‘Ban Ki-moon’
refers to the 8th Secretary-General of the United Nations, or indeed know a
priori anything else about what object Ban Ki-moon is. Nor is such knowledge
obtainable merely by consulting intuition. Similarly, the claims in (8) and (11)
that S uses ‘Columbus’ and ‘Richard Feynman’ competently to refer to
Columbus and Richard Feynman, respectively, are not justified by intuitions.
Those premises report straightforward facts about names and their referents,
which we can know only by first observing correlations between S’s linguistic
usage and extra-linguistic entities, and then checking against trustworthy
dictionaries, encyclopedias, or similar.  Since the arguments from ignorance
and error merely draw on de facto linguistic practice, we can seek observational
knowledge of the reference relation without epistemic reliance on intuitions.
Deutsch ( 2009 : 448–9) uses Evans’ ( 1973 : 196) ‘Madagascar’ example to
make a similar point. A plain causal-historical theory has it that’Madagascar’
refers to a portion of the African mainland in virtue of a causal-historical chain
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out a large island off Africa’s eastern coast. Epistemic appeal to intuition is
neither here nor there. The fact that’Madagascar’ refers to the island is not
known by consulting intuitions. In Deutsch’s (op. cit.) words,”Evans could have
simply checked his world atlas and seen that’Madagascar’ refers to the island.”
As the other shared premise (7)/(10) is true by definition, the upshot is that the
two semantic arguments that concern actual cases do not call upon intuitions to
do any epistemic work in supporting the premises of either version.
Let’s now proceed to ponder the semantic argument that concerns hypothetical
cases. The arguments from error and ignorance leave untouched what Ichikawa
et al (2011: 8) call “weak weak descriptivism” according to which D
determines the reference of n only in cases where S does possess such uniquely
identifying information. Weak weak descriptivism is thus weaker than weak
descriptivism in that weak descriptivism does not qualify the reference-
determining role of D  to such cases. Here is Kripke ( 1980 : 83–84):
Imagine the following blatantly fictional situation… Suppose that Gödel was
not in fact the discoverer of the incompleteness theorem. A man
named’Schmidt’, whose body was found in Vienna under mysterious
circumstances many years ago, actually did the work in question. His friend
Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript and it was thereafter attributed to
Gödel. On the view in question [i.e., the weak weak descriptivist view], then,
when our ordinary man uses the proper name’Gödel’, he really means to refer to
Schmidt, because Schmidt is the unique person satisfying the description’the
man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic’. Of course you might try
changing it to ‘the man who published the discovery of the incompleteness of
arithmetic’. By changing the story a little further one can make even this
formulation false. Anyway, most people might not even know whether the thing
was published or got around by word of mouth. Let’s stick to ‘the man who
discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic’. So, since the man who discovered
the incompleteness of arithmetic is in fact Schmidt, we, when we talk about
‘Gödel’, are in fact always referring to Schmidt. But it seems to me that we are
not. We simply are not.
Kripke (op. cit.) emphasizes that what we are asked to imagine is a “blatantly
fictional situation”. The claim is not that Gödel failed to discover the
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theorem.  Kripke’s point ( 1980 : 87) is rather that since our true belief that
Gödel was the discoverer is based on historical scholarship, that belief amounts
to a posteriori knowledge, and so the “fantasy” about Schmidt cannot be ruled
out a priori. We can imagine as false any known proposition p for which we
have only empirical evidence, in the sense that p might be false for all we know
a priori. It follows that we can imagine as true any (“blatantly fictional”)
proposition q the truth of which is incompatible with the truth of p, in the sense
that q might be true for all we know a priori.
The pressing question is now which kind of possibility is being envisaged in the
Gödel case. Both experimental semanticists and their opponents have
uncritically assumed that a counterfactual scenario is being described, i.e., a
way things might have been but are not. Deutsch (2009 : 451), Ichikawa et al
(2011: 11), Devitt ( 2010 : 423), Machery et al. ( 2012 ) and Genone ( 2012 : 154)
are cases in point. The remainder of this section argues that the example
pertains instead to a counteractual scenario, i.e., a way things might actually
(turn out to) be.  Their misunderstanding is exegetically interesting, but the
more important lesson is about the role of intuitions in those indicative
conditionals that reflect counteractual possibilities.  Section IV then argues
that MMNS’ vignette is afflicted by an ambiguity to do precisely with
counteractual suppositions.
The first indication that the Gödel case concerns a counteractual scenario is the
occurrence of the locutions “in fact” and “actual”. We are being asked to
imagine that the actual world might be such that Schmidt rather than Gödel
discovered the incompleteness theorem. As mentioned, we know a posteriori
that Gödel proved the theorem, and so there is no possible world consistent with
our empirical evidence in which Gödel failed to prove it, but we can still
conceive of a world where Schmidt is the discoverer as actual, in the sense of it
being a possibility for all we know a priori. Also, had Kripke intended a
counterfactual scenario, surely he would have used subjunctive terminology or
alethic modalities to describe the case, as he does with ‘Benjamin Franklin’ and
‘Hesperus’ ( 1980 : 57–58, 145–146). The lack of subjunctive mood suggests
that was not his intention. Further, at this stage in the dialectics, Kripke is
criticizing the weak descriptivist claim that D  is a reference-fixer of n in the
actual world (@) regardless of how @ turns out. His claim is that this view is
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identifying information about n’s referent. And the way to argue for that is to
show that S uses n to refer to its actual referent x even if @ might be such that x
fails to satisfy an associated D . So, in the Gödel case, S is mistaken about who
satisfies D  in w taken as a candidate for @, whereas in the argument from
error S is mistaken about who satisfies D  in @, yet in both cases does S use n
to refer to x. We can regiment the reasoning as follows:
(13) If weak weak descriptivism is true, then S uses proper name n
competently to refer to x in all w considered as actual in virtue of
associating definite description D  with n which is uniquely satisfied by
x, where both n and D  are actually used in our language
(14) S uses n (‘Gödel’) competently to refer to x (Gödel) in all w considered
as actual, but D  (’the discoverer of the incompleteness theorem’) as
associated with n by S is uniquely satisfied by distinct object x*
(Schmidt) in w* considered as actual
(15) So, weak weak descriptivism is false
In contrast, the modal argument pertains to the reference of n at w considered as
counterfactual.  As Salmon ( 2005 : 30) notes, the question in the modal
argument is what the truth-value of a sentence containing n becomes when
evaluated at certain possible circumstances. In this semantic argument,
however, the issue is not whom n actually refers to at the imagined
circumstances, but the more direct and non-modal issue of whom n would refer
to were those circumstances to obtain. Compare with Donnellan’s Thales
example (1970: 352–353):
[All most people know of Thales is that he was the Greek philosopher who held
that all is water]. But suppose no one to have held the ridiculous doctrine that
all is water, but that Aristotle and Herodotus were referring to […] a real person
who was not a philosopher, but a well-digger with a reputation for saying wise
things and who once exclaimed ‘I wish everything were water so I wouldn’t
have to dig these damned wells’. Have [our histories of philosophy] mentioned
a non-existent person or have they mentioned someone who existed but who did
not have the properties they attribute to him? My inclination is to say the latter.
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descriptivism] would tell us that Thales did not exist. But then to whom were
Aristotle and Herodotus referring? Surely we cannot conclude,’to no one’.
In this passage, Donnellan asks us to make a supposition about a way @ might
turn out. In effect, he argues that if weak weak descriptivism is true such that
‘the Greek philosopher who held that all is water’ fixes the reference of ‘Thales’
in @, then ‘Thales’ is empty in w considered as actual in which no single Greek
philosopher uniquely held that philosophical doctrine. But since Aristotle and
Herodotus could certainly be mistaken about which contingent properties
Thales had, e.g., we could discover that he was after all a well-digger, then
‘Thales’ refers to Thales even in that w. For if, as weak weak descriptivism
predicts, we have to say that Thales did not exist in that w, then the
commonplace possibility that we should be deceived about what he did and said
would be illusory.
Unlike the modal argument where we ask the counterfactual question of what
might have been the case given the way @ is, in Kripke and Donnellan’s
versions of the semantic argument, we ask the counteractual question of what is
the case if a hypothesis H about @ is true. We can say that H is true in
counteractual w if and only if H is the case if it turns out w does in fact obtain.
Given that Gödel ≠ Schmidt in @, it’s metaphysically impossible that Gödel =
Schmidt. But as we cannot rule out a priori that Gödel = Schmidt, that identity
is an epistemic possibility in the sense of there being, as Kripke ( 1980 : 152)
put it, a “qualitatively identical epistemic situation” in which Schmidt is
responsible for all the Gödel-appearances. On Kripke’s view, since the reference
of’Gödel’ is not fixed descriptively, strictly speaking, that Gödel ≠ Schmidt
could not have turned out otherwise. When we consider w as a candidate for @,
we make a hypothesis about the way that @ is, though we need not believe that
@ is that way, indeed we often know a posteriori that @ is not that way.
Following Chalmers ( 2004 : 179, 182; 2006 : 77, 80; 2011 : 105), counteractual
possibilities, such as those entertained in the Gödel and Thales cases, are best
captured by indicative conditionals :
(16) If Schmidt discovered the incompleteness theorem, then Schmidt"="
Gödel.
(17) If no single individual is a Greek philosopher who held that all is water,
14
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then Thales did not exist.
Following Chalmers (op. cit.), these indicative conditionals behave
epistemically, turning on whether an appropriate epistemic relation between the
antecedent and the consequent obtain. That allows for the possibility of offering
a possible worlds account despite the consequent in (16) seeming to be
metaphysically impossible. Thus, (16) is true if and only if the epistemically
closest scenario in which Schmidt discovered the incompleteness theorem is a
scenario in which Schmidt = Gödel. Scenarios, or w considered as actual, (or
centered w as ordered sets of S and a time t in w) are epistemic possibilities in
that they are ways things might be for all S knows a priori. Likewise, we can
say a proposition p is epistemically possible just in case ¬p is not a priori
knowable. Scenarios comprise Chalmers’ epistemic space: the space of ways
things might be for all S knows a priori. One scenario is epistemically closer
than another for S to the extent that it is more compatible with S’s knowledge.
Epistemic closeness is thus subject-relative, and depends on what S knows.
Take the epistemically closest scenario verifying ‘Schmidt discovered the
incompleteness theorem’. Verification is used as an epistemic notion that
concerns ways @ might be. We can thus say that proposition p is epistemically
possible if and only if there is a scenario that verifies p. The scenario most
compatible with S’s knowledge is one in which Schmidt discovered the
incompleteness theorem instead of Gödel. For S has identifying knowledge of
Gödel other than being the discoverer of that theorem, and distinct from S’s
identifying knowledge of Schmidt. Thereafter, the manuscript was somehow
attributed to Gödel but not Schmidt. This scenario thus falsifies ‘Schmidt"="
Gödel’. Since the epistemically closest scenario verifying the antecedent is one
that falsifies the consequent, (16) is false. Likewise, (17) is true if and only if
the epistemically closest scenario in which no single Greek philosopher held the
view that all is water is a scenario in which Thales is non-existent. Take the
epistemically closest scenario verifying ‘no single Greek philosopher held the
view that all is water’. The scenario most compatible with our knowledge is one
in which either Thales did not hold that view or he took up some other
profession such as well-digging. This scenario thus falsifies ‘Thales did not
exist’. Since the epistemically closest scenario verifying the antecedent is one
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The key point is now that, in keeping with both the letter and spirit of Kripke
and Donnellan’s texts, semantic intuitions play no role in determining the truth-
value of these indicative conditionals, nor therefore does the invariability of
such intuitions play any such role. In contrast, as shown in Section II, semantic
intuitions do play a role in determining the truth-value of corresponding
subjunctive conditionals. Relatedly, in contrast with the modal argument,
neither Kripke nor Donnellan make any evidential appeal to intuitions in the
course of their respective semantic arguments.  Although Cappelen ( 2012 )
does not discuss these semantic arguments, they lend some support to his claim
that philosophers do not rely on intuitions as evidence for their theories. All that
is brought to bear is identifying, empirical knowledge of Gödel and Thales, plus
the admission of epistemic fallibility. With that in mind, let’s revisit Kripke’s
semantic argument (13) – (15). As (13) is true by definition, the question is
whether the justification of (14) hangs on intuition. We are being asked to
envisage a scenario in which Schmidt was the unique discoverer of the
incompleteness theorem. (14) has it that in that scenario S uses ‘Gödel’ to refer
to Gödel rather than Schmidt, and so S will reject the claim that Schmidt =
Gödel. But that is exactly what the negation of (16) says: if Schmidt discovered
the incompleteness theorem, then Schmidt ≠ Gödel. Since semantic intuitions
play no role in determining the truth-value of (16), neither do they play a role in
justifying (14). MMNS once more overstate the importance of the epistemic
role of intuitions in that (MC) simply finds no application in the semantic
arguments.
If Kripke and Donnellan are right, then ordinary proper names do not function
as descriptive names in the way Evans’ (1979) ‘Julius’ or Kripke’s ( 1980 : 79)
‘Jack the Ripper’ do. Thus, if ‘Julius’ is stipulated to refer to whoever in @
invented the zip fastener, then even on the assumption that S knows that
Whitcomb L. Judson invented the zip fastener, S will judge the following true:
(18) If Lord Kelvin invented the zip fastener, then Lord Kelvin = Julius
AQ5
After all, the antecedent in (18) expresses a genuine epistemic possibility, at
least if understood as being compatible with what S knows a priori. Put
differently, descriptive names are subjunctively rigid, but epistemically non-
17
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rigid: they refer to the same object at every counterfactual w but to different
objects in different counteractual w. Kripke and Donnellan arguably took proper
names to be both subjunctively and epistemically rigid. Such names cannot
refer to objects other than their actual bearers without a change in their
semantic contents. This follows if, as direct referentialists maintain, their
semantic contributions are stated in object-dependent ways.  In particular, the
Gödel and Thales cases lend support to the epistemic rigidity of proper names.
In contrast, Chalmers ( 2011 : 85) denies the existence of epistemically rigid
terms for concrete objects: no term picks out the same concrete object in all
scenarios. Since, on his view, the referents of epistemically rigid terms do not
vary with empirical variation in how @ turns out, those referents are a priori
available. So, no concrete object is a priori available as the referent of a term.
Note, however, that Chalmers would not consider (16) and (17) true as he
eschews such an unadorned version of weak descriptivism. Contrast (16) with:
(19) If Schmidt discovered the incompleteness theorem, is the causal origin
of our use of ‘Gödel’, is the individual called ‘Gödel’ by expert
speakers, etc., then it turns out that Schmidt"="Gödel
Although very improbable, if @ turns out to be such that all these Gödel-
appearances are due to Schmidt, then on Chalmers’ view it turns out that Gödel
= Schmidt. Hence (19) is true.  The information in the antecedent need not
amount to a cluster of D  that uniquely picks out the referent of ‘Gödel’.
Rather, if all identifying information that is believed to be true of Gödel is
instead true of Schmidt, then it turns out that Schmidt = Gödel. That we are
wrong about @ in those respects is an epistemic possibility: a hypothesis about
@ which cannot be ruled out a priori. A scenario verifying ‘Schmidt = Gödel’ is
one in which someone managed to mislead us into believing there were two
distinct individuals, one going under the name ‘Schmidt’ who died under
mysterious circumstances in Vienna, and another named ‘Gödel’ who
discovered the incompleteness theorem.
4.  Experimental Semantics Revisited
Let’s now revisit the charge that MMNS level against Kripke and other analytic
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(20) “Theories of reference are assessed by consulting one’s intuitions about
the reference of terms in hypothetical situations.”
(21) “In light of recent work in cultural psychology showing systematic
cognitive differences between East Asians and Westerners […], an
experiment was conducted which […] indicated that Westerners are
more likely than East Asians to report intuitions that are consistent with
the causal-historical view.”
(22) “These results constitute prima facie evidence that semantic intuitions
vary from culture to culture.”
(23) “This fact raises questions about the nature of the philosophical
enterprise of developing a theory of reference.”
Premise (20) is basically a restatement of (MC). Premise (21) draws on Nisbett
et al. ( 2001 ), showing that culture plays a dramatic role in shaping human
cognition. In particular, there are large and systematic differences between East
Asians (EAs) and Westerners (Ws) on a number of basic cognitive processes,
including perception, attention and memory. The cross-cultural work indicates
that EAs are more inclined to judge holistically on the basis of similarity,
whereas Ws are more disposed to analyze and make causation-based judgments
in describing reality.
This dissimilar focus suggests there might be a related cross-cultural difference
in semantic intuitions. MMNS predicted that when presented with the Gödel
case, EAs are more likely to respond in accordance with the descriptivist
account on which the referent x of n has to satisfy D , while Ws are more likely
to respond in accordance with the causal-historical account on which x need
only figure in the causal history of the current use of n. To test this prediction,
MMNS (2004: 6–8) presented a group of US students and a group of Chinese
students, both fluent speakers of English, with a vignette closely modeled on
Kripke’s own example:
Suppose that John has learned in College that Gödel is the man who proved an
important mathematical theorem, called the incompleteness of arithmetic. John
D
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is quite good at mathematics and he can give an accurate statement of the
incompleteness theorem, which he attributes to Gödel as the discoverer. But this
is the only thing he has heard about Gödel. Now suppose Gödel was not the
author of this theorem. A man called ‘Schmidt’ whose body was found in
Vienna under mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the work
in question. His friend Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript and claimed
credit for the work, which was thereafter attributed to Gödel. Thus he has been
known as the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. Most people
who have heard the name’Gödel’ are like John; the claim that Gödel discovered
the incompleteness theorem is the only thing they have ever heard about Gödel.
When John uses the name ‘Gödel’, is he talking about:
(A) the person who really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic? or
(B) the person who got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the
work?
MMNS found that semantic intuitions, as elicited by this probe, vary both
across and within cultures: a majority of Americans gave the causal-historical
response (B), but a sizable minority of the population (45 %) gave the
descriptivist response (A). In contrast, a majority of Chinese participants chose
(A), but a sizable minority (30 %) chose (B). Thus, evidence suggests analytic
philosophers of language should be wary of assuming upfront the universality
of their own semantic intuitions. But if such intuitions provide no reliable guide
to semantic properties, then given (MC), it seems the attempt to construct a
theory of reference is misguided.
Here is a non-exhaustive list of already published objections to (20) – (23). (i)
As mentioned earlier, Ichikawa et al. (2011) and Devitt (2010 ) point out that
intuitions about the hypothetical Gödel case play at best a limited role in
Kripke’s broader arguments, so experimental data undermining their regularity
do not cast serious doubt on his attack on weak descriptivism. (ii) Devitt ( 2010 )
argues that since semantic intuitions arise from reflection on linguistic data,
philosophers who aim to find the correct theory of reference should prefer those
intuitions that are informed by a cautious examination of the philosophical
significance of the probes to unschooled intuitions of the folk. (iii) Ludwig
( 2007 ) and Deutsch ( 2009 ) suggest the question at the end of the vignette is
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ambiguous in that Kripke advanced a theory of semantic reference, but when
asked who John is talking about when using ‘Gödel’, many will take this to be a
question about (pragmatic) speaker’s reference. (iv) Marti (2009) and Devitt
( 2012 ) claim that MMNS test the participants’ meta-linguistic intuitions about
theories of reference rather than their linguistic intuitions about the use of
referring terms, but one should carefully distinguish between what is thought to
be the correct theory of reference and how names are used to talk about things.
MMNS (2009; 2012), Machery ( 2012 ), and Machery et al. ( forthcoming ) have
offered seemingly compelling responses to (i) – (iii), and Machery et al.
( 2009a , b ) provide a knockdown reply to (iv). I shall not discuss (i) – (iv) here.
Let’s instead dwell on Sytsma and Livengood’s ( 2011 : 319–320; cf.
forthcoming) more promising claim that the Gödel vignette suffers from an
ambiguity in whether the participants adopt the subject’s (John) or the narrator’s
epistemic perspective in deciding who is denoted by each of the answer choices
given in the forced-choice test question. Whereas John, remember, is the
speaker who uses ‘Gödel’, the narrator is someone who allegedly possesses
information that John lacks. Sytsma and Livengood ran a series of experiments
showing that this epistemic ambiguity affects the participants’ responses in their
study. By parity of reasoning, this suggests that the same ambiguity also
accounts for the variation in MMNS’ study. They conclude that the responses to
the Gödel vignette do not reliably indicate the participants’ semantic intuitions.
Sytsma and Livengood ( 2011 : 319–320, cf. forthcoming) explain the
perspectival ambiguity as an “…asymmetry between John’s knowledge and the
narrator’s knowledge”. But what exactly does the narrator know that John fails
to know? Sytsma and Livengood are silent on this crucial point. Perhaps, as
Genone ( 2012 : 157) suggests, “the narrator knows that the descriptive
information associated with ‘Gödel’ is false… whereas [John] lacks knowledge
that the associated description is false”. But the vignette tells us that John has
learned in College that Gödel is the man who proved the incompleteness of
arithmetic. On the assumption that learning that p is a way of knowing that p, it
follows that John knows that Gödel proved the incompleteness theorem.  In
fact, that is all John knows about Gödel. The narrator’s additional knowledge
cannot then be that it is false that Gödel proved that theorem, or that the distinct
individual Schmidt was the sole author. For that leads to a contradiction given
the factivity of knowledge.
20
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A more promising proposal of what the epistemic asymmetry between the
narrator and the subject John consists in is to relativize their knowledge to
which suppositions they accept about the actual world (@).  Accepting the
supposition of the scenario, the narrator knows that Schmidt discovered the
incompleteness theorem, but making no supposition about the scenario, John
knows nothing about Schmidt. Indeed, given that John accepts the supposition
that Gödel discovered the theorem on the basis of what he learned (or was
taught) in College, he would seem to know exactly that. Still, the factivity of
knowledge does not render this proposal inconsistent, because the two
ascriptions of knowledge are true only under distinct suppositions about the
way @ is. But this means that given the way @ is, there is no difference in what
John and the narrator actually knows. In @ Gödel discovered the theorem, and
so in @ the narrator cannot know that Schmidt discovered that theorem, no
matter which suppositions the narrator accepts about @. Of course, the narrator
may be said to have that knowledge if the supposition the narrator accepts about
@ turns out (very surprisingly) to be true, but we know a posteriori that in
actual fact things are not that way.
Nevertheless, Sytsma and Livengood are on to something when they detect a
perspectival ambiguity in MMNS’ test questions. The question is: if the alleged
asymmetry between John and the narrator does not pertain to knowledge of @,
what else could it consist in? Unbeknownst to John, the narrator asks the
participants to suppose that Schmidt was the author of the theorem, and that his
friend Gödel got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work.
Bearing Section III in mind, to make that supposition is to consider this
scenario as a way things might actually (turn out to) be.  This means that the
participants are being asked by the narrator to answer the question of whom
John is in actual fact talking about in that scenario when he uses ‘Gödel’: (A) or
(B)? John is entirely unaware of this scenario. Indeed, as he has never heard of
Schmidt, he makes no supposition about its actuality. So, the asymmetry
between John and the narrator is not so much epistemic as concerning which
counteractual suppositions are in play.  Unlike John, the narrator asks the
counteractual question of what ‘Gödel’ picks out if a hypothesis about Gödel is
true in @. We can now show that depending on which such perspective the
participants adopt, the answer choices given in the forced-choice test question
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Suppose first that participant S adopts the narrator’s suppositional perspective,
which is obviously what MMNS intend S to do. From this perspective, S may
opt to answer either (A) or (B) when asked whom John is talking about when he
uses ‘Gödel’, depending on whether S has descriptivist or causal-historical
leanings. If S takes ‘Gödel’ to function as a descriptive name, S will give
answer (A). This means S will judge that John uses ‘Gödel’ to refer to Schmidt
in the imagined scenario. The reason is that Schmidt is the person whom the
narrator takes to have discovered the incompleteness theorem. The narrator,
remember, is supposing that @ is such that Schmidt was the author of that
theorem instead of Gödel who merely got hold of the manuscript and claimed
credit for the work. If instead S takes ‘Gödel’ to pick out the individual at the
end of the causal-historical chain leading up to John’s use of that name, S will
give answer (B). Since Gödel is causally responsible for John’s tokens of
‘Gödel’, S will then judge that he is the man whom John is referring to in the
scenario in question. So, as long as S adopts the narrator’s perspective, the
respective answers (A) and (B) seem to track S’s semantic intuitions.
Suppose instead participant S* adopts John’s perspective. John has no inkling as
to what supposition S* is being asked by the narrator to make about @. Since
all John knows is that Gödel discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic, S*
will answer (A) when asked whom John is talking about when he uses ‘Gödel’.
Still, S* will take John to use that name to refer to Gödel in MMNS’ imagined
scenario. This follows regardless of whether S* has descriptivist or causal-
historical leanings. If S* takes ‘Gödel’ to function as a descriptive name, then
from John’s perspective S* will judge that John is picking out Gödel, because
Gödel is the person whom John takes to be the discoverer of that theorem. The
same is true if instead S* takes ‘Gödel’ to refer to the individual who is causally
responsible for John’s tokens of that name. For Gödel is that individual
irrespective of which perspective is adopted. The problem is that (A) was
supposed by MMNS to be the exclusively descriptivist option, showing that
‘Gödel’ picks out Schmidt in the scenario in question. Adopting John’s
perspective thus involves opting for (A) while judging that John uses ‘Gödel’ to
pick out Gödel. Pace MMNS, answer (A) is therefore no reliable guide to
descriptivist intuitions.25
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5.  Conclusion
This paper argued that friends and foes of experimental semantics have failed to
pay attention to two distinct types of possible cases involving the referential use
of proper names. Both camps have focused on the alleged evidential role of
semantic intuitions in the actual and counteractual cases that Kripke brings to
bear in support of his semantic arguments rather than the counterfactual cases
that he adduces in support of his modal argument. The counteractual and
counterfactual cases are meant to elicit such intuitions about certain
counteractual and counterfactual possibilities, respectively. And indeed when
evaluating the subjunctive conditionals that reflect those counterfactual
possibilities, these intuitions do carry some evidential weight, albeit not in a
way that requires the exercise of any sui generis faculty of intuition. But
semantic intuitions arguably play no epistemic role in determining the actual
reference of proper names, or in evaluating the indicative conditionals that
reflect the relevant counteractual possibilities. Moreover, once an asymmetry is
acknowledged in our vignette between which suppositions the narrator and the
subject make about actuality, a novel account of the alleged culturally
determined variation in semantic intuitions is forthcoming. Depending on which
such suppositional perspective the participants adopt, the upshot was that their
answers do not reliably indicate which theory of reference they implicitly
adhere to.
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 MMNS are right that even if Kripke’s arguments refute descriptivism, the question of what
the correct, fully worked-out theory of reference is has not thereby been settled. Since we
currently have no firm conception of what shape the ultimate theory will have, whether
finessing all the details will require epistemic reliance on semantic intuitions is hard to predict.
For now, we have to start somewhere, and nothing prevents us from sharing MMNS’ point of
departure.
 We follow Soames (op. cit.) in characterizing the view that D  fixes the reference of n as
being weaker than the view that D  and n are synonymous, in the sense that the latter entails
the former but not the other way around. However, if the issue is approached by contrasting
semantics with meta-semantics, the two views are certainly distinct, but one is not logically
weaker or stronger than the other. I owe this point to an anonymous referee for this journal.
 See also Soames ( 2005 : 16).
 Or to use one of Kripke’s examples (1980: 48) from which (ITR) can be extracted: ‘Nixon’ is
rigid but ‘the US President in 1970’ is not, because: “…although someone other than the US
President in 1970 might have been the US President in 1970 (e.g., Humphrey might have), no
one other than Nixon might have been Nixon.” A die-hard descriptivist might try to exploit the
fact that sentences of the form ‘D  might not have been D ’ have a true wide-scope reading
and a false narrow-scope reading, but here we shall simply ignore such manoeuver.
 See for example Yablo ( 2002 ) and Chalmers ( 2006 ).
 Given that exercising such abilities constitute grasp of the semantic content of n, and that
understanding a proposition p as expressed by a sentence that contains n involves grasping its
semantic content, the current proposal is that in such cases an intuition that p justifies belief in
p in virtue of that intuition being based on understanding of p. Chudhoff (forthcoming) offers
counterexamples to the general claim that whenever an intuition that p justifies belief in p, that
intuition results from understanding of p. Whether this understanding-based view of intuition is
correct in all cases where intuitions are claimed to carry evidential weight, as Bealer ( 2002 ,
2004 ) and Ludwig ( 2007 ) contend, is a thorny question beyond the scope of this paper.
 In this paper we set Kripke’s epistemic argument aside.
 See for instance Wright ( 2000 : 206–210).
 Turning to intuition in such cases seems odd in much the same way an appeal to the intuition
that one weighs more than three pounds is a misguided attempt to refute the brain-criterion of
personal identity. The example is Williamson’s ( 2007 : 214–219). He concedes that skeptical
contexts could make such appeal legitimate. For instance, it would not be strange to say ‘well,
intuitively, that’s a mountain’ (while pointing at a mountain) in reply to a philosopher who
argues that mountains fail to exist. But neither party to the current dispute endorses skepticism
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recommends we check linguistic usage, thus seeking direct evidence for the reference relation
itself.
 Sytsma, Livengood, Sato and Oguchi (forthcoming) take Kripke’s Gödel case to show that
“descriptivist accounts of proper names cannot handle cases where ignorance leads a speaker to
associate some description with the wrong individual.” But as Ichikawa et al. (2011: 8)
correctly note, the Gödel case is not part of an argument from ignorance. It rather illustrates
that descriptivism makes false predictions about the reference of n even when S associates a
D  that is uniquely satisfied by the actual referent of n. Pace Ichikawa et al., as we shall now
argue, these predictions pertain to the reference of n in counteractual scenarios.
 Following Chalmers ( 2004 : 159; 2006 : 59), when we consider a counterfactual scenario,
we make a counterfactual supposition: given the way @ is, what if it had been such-and-such a
way? In contrast, when we consider a counteractual scenario, we make a supposition about a
way @ might be: what if @ is (or turns out to be) such-and-such a way? To use Stalnaker’s
example ( 2001 : 146) we can ask ‘what if Oswald had not killed Kennedy?’ or we can ask
‘what if Oswald did not kill Kennedy?’ In the first case, given that Oswald did actually kill
Kennedy, we want to know what would have happened had he not done so. Presumably,
Kennedy would not have been killed. In the second case, we want to know what follows if
Oswald is not the killer. Certainly, someone else is. These two distinct ways of considering
possible cases are familiar from two-dimensional semantics. To what extent Kripke ( 1980 )
would endorse this framework is a vexed question. We shall draw on Chalmers’ interpretation
( 2004 ; 2006 ; 2011 ) of Kripke, which stems from his so-called epistemic two-dimensionalism,
bearing in mind that Soames ( 2005 ), Salmon ( 2005 ), Stalnaker ( 2001 ) and others read Kripke
rather differently. Still, as just illustrated, they share many two-dimensional distinctions, and
they can also agree that these are implicitly put to use by Kripke is his attack on traditional
descriptivism.
 An anonymous referee suggested that since Kripke’s passage is temptingly (albeit
incorrectly on my view) read as pertaining to a counterfactual scenario, one should treat the
somewhat subtle mistake made by these philosophers with charity. I do agree that much of the
dispute over experimental semantics cannot be resolved merely by paying attention to those
two readings of that passage. The more modest goal of this paper is merely to establish that
rational intuitions play very different epistemic roles when brought to bear on counterfactual
and counteractual possibilities.
 We henceforth adopt the convention that n refers at w when w is considered as
counterfactual, and n refers in w when either w"="@ or w is considered as actual.
 See also Weatherson ( 2001 ) and Yablo ( 2002 ). Grammatical moods provide a reliable but
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while some subjunctive conditionals fail to convey counterfactuality, some indicative
conditionals do express counterfactuality.
 In contrast, as we saw in Section II, evaluation of counterfactual conditionals is independent
of S’s knowledge. For instance, both ‘if the Queen had come to my wedding yesterday, I would
have met her’ and ‘if the Queen was at my wedding yesterday, I didn't meet her’ are true, but
the known fact that I did not meet the Queen is retained only under the indicative supposition.
 While the foregoing is based specifically on Chalmers’ notion of epistemic modality ( 2004 ;
2006 ; 2011 ), (16) and (17) also come out false for similar reasons on related accounts. Thus
Nolan ( 2003 ) provides an account of the semantics of indicative conditionals in terms of a
similarity relation defined on w. Closeness of w is measured by a metric of similarity. When
evaluating an indicative conditional, we look (i) at the w where the antecedent is true, (ii)
where what we know is kept fixed, insofar as it is compatible with the antecedent, (iii) to the
extent that (i) and (ii) leave the nature of @ open, the similarity metric is otherwise similar to
that of the subjunctive conditional. Importantly, on Nolan’s account (2003: 238), the truth-
conditions of a sentence expressing an indicative conditional can vary from informational
context to informational context. Similarly, (16) and (17) are rendered false even on Yablo’s
account (2009: 454) where p → q mixes the indicative and subjunctive conditional.
 There is a striking disanalogy in Kripke’s ( 1980 ) between the examples, e.g., ‘Nixon’ and
‘Aristotle’, which are used in the course of the modal argument, and the examples, e.g.,
‘Gödel’, ‘Columbus’ and ‘Feynman’, which are used in the course of the semantic arguments,
in that Kripke explicitly appeals to intuitions about possible cases involving the referents of
these names only in the case of the former. In the case of the latter names, Kripke talks directly
about who we are referring to if a hypothesis about @ is true, rather than citing our intuitions
about who we are referring to.
 Just as Evans (1979) distinguished between superficial and deep necessity, Davies (2004:
110–111) distinguishes between superficially and deeply rigid designators.
AQ6
AQ7
 Indeed a priori true, assuming somewhat contentiously that the descriptions in (16) capture
the primary/epistemic intension of ‘Gödel’, which is a function from w considered as actual (a
space of scenarios) to referents in those w (scenarios). The primary/epistemic intension of a
sentence is true in w if w verifies that sentence.
 Orthodoxy has it that ‘learns that’ is a success verb. Hazlett ( 2010 ) offers an example of a
non-factive use: ‘in school we learned that World War I was a war to “make the world safe for
democracy,” when it was really a war to make the world safe for the Western imperial powers.’
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taught that’. But no linguistic cues suggest the vignette is such that ‘John has learnt in College
that Gödel proved the incompleteness theorem’ is synonymous with ‘John was taught in
College that Gödel proved the incompleteness theorem’. After all, nobody disputes that ‘has
learnt that’ has a factive use in many, but perhaps not all, cases where the embedded
proposition is true. Thus, a salient reading of ‘learned that’ in ‘John learned in College that
Gödel proved the incompleteness theorem, when in actual fact Schmidt proved that theorem’ is
arguably ‘was taught that’. So, at least some participants in the experiment may well
understand ‘learnt that’ as requiring truth. Compare with ‘hearing that’ which also has both
factive (perceptual) and non-factive (testimonial) uses. When used in the factive way, ‘hearing
that’ arguably expresses a way of knowing. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising the
point about learning.
 An anonymous referee made this interesting suggestion.
 Just as in Kripke’s original Gödel case, MMNS’s narrator asks us, or the participants, to
suppose Gödel was not the author of this theorem, but that a man called ‘Schmidt’ “actually did
the work in question”. Similarly, in Sytsma and Livengood’s ( 2011 : 324) twist on MMNS’s
vignette, the participants are asked the question of whether they take John to “actually be
talking about the person who […] is widely believed to have discovered the incompleteness of
arithmetic, but actually got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work”. In all three
cases are we thus being asked to make a supposition about a way @ might (turn out to) be,
even though we, or the participants, may well know a posteriori that @ is not that way.
 Sytsma, Livengood, Sato and Oguchi (forthcomning) write that “from the narrator’s
perspective, Schmidt discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic […], but as far as John
knows, Gödel discovered the theorem”. Formulating the perspectival ambiguity in this way is
consistent with John and the narrator accepting different suppositions about @ without
different knowledge ascriptions being true of them.
 We have argued that the narrators in MMNS’s and Sytsma and Livengood’s vignettes are
best interpreted as asking the participants to entertain counteractual scenarios, just as Kripke
asked us to consider his original Gödel case as a way things might actually (turn out to) be, but
I have offered no proof that the participants reading those vignettes also understand the
narrator’s question that way. Short of experimental testing, which would make for a different
paper, it seems impossible to completely rule out any misunderstanding of that question. But
on the assumption of proficiency in English, the linguistic cues contained in the vignette makes
it unlikely that the participants should mistake a counteractual scenario for a counterfactual
scenario. Ordinary competent speakers are sensitive to that distinction when they reliably
provide correct answers to pairs of questions such as Stalnaker’s ( 2001 : 146) ‘what if Oswald
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reasonably be expected to be tuned into the difference between ‘what ‘Gödel’ refers to if
Schmidt discovered the incompleteness theorem’ and ‘what ‘Gödel’ would refer to if Schmidt
had discovered the incompleteness theorem?’. True, unlike Kripke’s original case, the vignettes
complicate matters by asking the participants what someone else, i.e., John, uses ‘Gödel’ to
refer to on the supposition that the parable about Schmidt is true. But John is not stipulated to
be any less conceptually competent; in fact John resembles most participants in that all he
knows about Gödel is that he proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. So, the introduction of
John should not lead the participants to misunderstand the test question in the envisaged way.
Bear also in mind that MMNS (2009; 2012) have already argued against Ludwig ( 2007 ),
Deutsch ( 2009 ), Martí ( 2009 ) and Devitt’s ( 2012 ) claim that the vignette trades on distinct
types of ambiguities, which might have lead the participants astray. I should like to thank an
anonymous referee for raising the issue of the participants’ understanding.
 Reflect that whenever a participant reports a descriptivist intuition, she must be expressing
a descriptivist intuition, whatever perspective she adopts. In which case, MMNS’s results
already demonstrate the presence of a very large proportion of descriptivist intuitions in both
East Asia and America, which is surprising. I owe this observation to an anonymous referee.
 Many thanks to Please change footnote 26 to:
Many thanks to the participants at the Buffalo Annual Experimental Philosophy Conference
2012, where an early version of this paper was presented, and also to two anonymous referees
for this journal for very helpful comments.[…], and to two anonymous referees for this journal
for very helpful and constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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